Diversity and Arbitrage in a Regulatory Breakup Model by Strong, Winslow & Fouque, Jean-Pierre
ar
X
iv
:1
00
3.
56
50
v2
  [
q-
fin
.G
N]
  2
9 D
ec
 20
10
Annals of Finance manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Diversity and Arbitrage in a Regulatory Breakup Model
Winslow Strong · Jean-Pierre Fouque
Received: 21 August 2010 / Accepted: 28 December 2010
Abstract In 1999 Robert Fernholz observed an inconsistency between the normative assumption of existence
of an equivalent martingale measure (EMM) and the empirical reality of diversity in equity markets. We
explore a method of imposing diversity on market models by a type of antitrust regulation that is compatible
with EMMs. The regulatory procedure breaks up companies that become too large, while holding the total
number of companies constant by imposing a simultaneous merge of other companies. The regulatory events
are assumed to have no impact on portfolio values. As an example, regulation is imposed on a market model
in which diversity is maintained via a log-pole in the drift of the largest company. The result is the removal
of arbitrage opportunities from this market while maintaining the market’s diversity.
Keywords Diversity · Arbitrage · Relative arbitrage · Equivalent martingale measure · Antitrust · Regulation
JEL Classification G11
1 Introduction
What does the empirical phenomenon of diversity in equity markets imply about investment opportunities in
those markets? The answer depends on the mechanism by which diversity is maintained.
The notion of diversity, the condition that no company’s capitalization (shares multiplied by stock price)
may approach that of the entire market, was introduced by Robert Fernholz in the paper Fernholz (1999a) and
the book Fernholz (2002) (see also the recent review Fernholz and Karatzas (2009)). He made the observation
in Fernholz (1999b) that one of the most useful tools of financial mathematics, the equivalent martingale
measure (EMM), implies for a large class of models something grossly inconsistent with real markets: lack
of diversity. Historically, the major world stock markets have been diverse, and they should be expected to
remain so as long as they are subject to a form of antitrust regulation that prevents concentration of capital
into a single company.
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Fernholz demonstrated under common assumptions of financial market modeling that diverse market
models necessarily admit strong relative arbitrage with respect to the market portfolio. Portfolio pi is a strong
relative arbitrage with respect to portfolio ρ on horizon [0,T ] if pi strictly outperforms ρ at time T with
probability one. A sufficient set of assumptions are: capitalizations are modeled by Itoˆ processes that pay
no dividends, trading may occur in continuous time with no transaction costs, and the covariance process
of the log capitalizations is uniformly elliptic. Importantly, the relative arbitrage portfolios of Fernholz do
not depend on the parameters of the market, and therefore do not require estimation of these parameters
to construct in practice. They are long-only portfolios (no short sales) derived from portfolio generating
functions (see Fernholz (1999b, 2002); Fernholz et al. (2005); Fernholz and Karatzas (2009, 2005)), requiring
only the weights of the market portfolio as input. If, additionally, the covariance process is bounded from
above uniformly in time, then no equivalent local martingale measure (ELMM) is possible for such models.
Therefore the fundamental theorem of asset pricing of Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994) implies that they
admit a free lunch with vanishing risk (FLVR).
To make the case that the argument above pertains to the existence of (approximate) relative arbitrages
in real markets, dividends must be taken into account. Dividends provide a means for large companies to
slow their growth in terms of capitalization while still generating competitive total returns (stock return +
dividend return) for their shareholders. An exploratory statistical analysis in Fernholz (1998) of the dividends
paid by companies traded on U.S. equity exchanges from 1967-1996 suggests that this factor has historically
been insufficient to jeopardize the argument for existence of relative arbitrage with respect to the U.S. market
portfolio over this period, before accounting for transaction costs.
It is not easy to formulate diverse Itoˆ process models (however see Osterrieder and Rheinla¨nder (2006)
for a clever probabilistic construction utilizing a non-equivalent measure change). Almost all market models
commonly used in the literature, including geometric Brownian motion, are not diverse, and therefore do
not accurately model reality. Any diverse Itoˆ process model with uniformly elliptic and uniformly bounded
covariance must have the characteristic that the difference in the rate of expected return of the largest com-
pany, compared to some other company, diverges to −∞ as the largest approaches a relative size cap (see
Fernholz et al. (2005)). Some possible economic rationale to support this type of model includes: difficulties
in achieving high return on investment for very largely capitalized companies and the cost of antitrust suits
brought against such companies.
Since the onset of antitrust regulation in the U.S. in the late 19th century, there have been two main regu-
latory methods of dealing with companies which get too large: antitrust suits or fines, and antitrust breakup.
The latter is rarely used, with some notable examples being the breakups of Standard Oil (1911) Standard
Oil v United States (1911) and AT&T (1982) United States v AT&T (1982). Suits or fines are used much
more often than breakups to discipline companies that are deemed to be dominating their market in an unfair
manner. Recent examples in Europe include Microsoft in Microsoft Corp. v European Commission (2004) in
2004 (¤497 million) and Intel in European Commission v Intel (2009) in 2009 (¤1.06 billion), both being
fined by the European Union for anticompetitive practices. Models in which diversity is maintained via the
rate of expected return of any company diverging to −∞ as that company’s relative size becomes very large
can be interpreted as continuous-path approximations of the case where suits or fines are used to regulate big
companies. Models in which regulatory breakup is the primary means of maintaining market diversity have
not been well-studied from a mathematical point of view in the financial mathematics literature. They are the
subject of this paper.
When a company is fined money, this directly and adversely affects the value of the company, so the risk
of antitrust fines is a mark against investing in large companies. In contrast, the key mathematical feature of
a corporate breakup with regards to investment is that capital need not be removed from the system. That is,
when a company is broken into parts, no net value needs to be lost. Indeed, from a regulator’s perspective,
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avoidance of monopolies maintains the viability of an industry’s innovation and growth prospects. Although
it need not be the case in practice, for simplicity, we make the modeling assumption that total market values
of companies, as well as the portfolio values of investors, are conserved at each regulatory breakup. The
conservation of portfolio value implies that the capital gains process from investment in equity is not the
stochastic integral of the trading strategy (shares of equity) with respect to the stock capitalization process.
Instead, a net capitalization process, with the finite number of regulatory jumps removed, plays the role of
integrator.
Another assumption we make is that the number of companies remains constant. This may seem incon-
sistent with the breakup of companies, but in our typical example of regulation we balance the number of
companies in the economy by also requiring that two companies merge into a new company at the same
time as regulation splits a company into two. This is imposed mainly for mathematical simplicity. It isolates
the effect of regulation on diversity and arbitrage while working in the familiar context of Rn-valued Itoˆ
processes.
As an application we examine a regulated form of a log-pole market model, a diverse model admitting
relative arbitrage with respect to the market portfolio. The regulation procedure removes the arbitrage oppor-
tunities from the market, resulting in a diverse and arbitrage-free market. Furthermore, the regulated form
satisfies the notion of “sufficient intrinsic volatility” of the market, a more general sufficient condition for
relative arbitrage in unregulated models (see Fernholz and Karatzas (2005)). These results do not contradict
the work of Fernholz et al., because in our model it is the regulated capitalization process that is diverse and
the net capitalization process (which has regulatory jumps removed) that has an EMM.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the class of premodels for the regulation procedure,
the admissible trading strategies, portfolios, and the notion of diversity. In Section 3 we introduce the regula-
tory procedure, including defining the regulatory mapping and the triggering mechanism for regulation. Our
exemplar of regulation, the split-merge rule, is also introduced, which essentially splits the biggest company
and forces the smallest two companies to merge at a regulatory event. The issue of arbitrage in regulated
markets is thoroughly explored and compared to the results of Fernholz et al. regarding arbitrage and diver-
sity in unregulated mode. Section 4 applies the regulatory procedure to geometric Brownian motion and to a
log-pole market model to illustrate the compatibility of diversity and EMMs in regulated models. Section 5
presents some concluding remarks and directions for future research. Section 6 contains several proofs.
2 Premodel
We first introduce the class of models that we will consider for regulation. We also define the set of trading
strategies that are admissible for discussions of arbitrage and define the notion of a portfolio for discussions
of relative arbitrage.
The stock capitalization process X˜ = (X˜1,t , . . . , X˜n,t)′t≥0 represents the capitalizations (number of shares
multiplied by stock price) of the n ≥ 2 companies which are traded on an exchange, where the notation A′
denotes the transpose of the matrix A. The stock capitalizations are each assumed to be almost surely (a.s.)
strictly positive for all time, with X˜ taking values in the open, connected, conic set Ox ⊆Rn++ := (0,∞)n. The
dynamics of X˜ is determined by the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dX˜i,t = X˜i,t
(
bi(X˜t)dt +
d
∑
ν=1
σiν(X˜t)dWν,t
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (2.1)
X˜0 = x0 ∈ Ox, (2.2)
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for which (Ω ,F ,F, X˜ ,W,P) is a solution, where W is a d-dimensional Brownian motion with d ≥ n. The
functions b(·) and σ(·) are assumed to be locally bounded Borel functions. We require that the SDE (2.1)
satisfies strong existence and pathwise uniqueness for any initial x0 ∈ Ox, and that P(X˜t ∈ Ox, ∀t ≥ 0) = 1.
We shall only consider volatility matrices σ(x) ∈Rn×d having full rank n, ∀x ∈Ox, which guarantees that no
stock’s risk can be completely hedged over any time interval by investment in the other stocks. We assume
that F and F0 contain N , the P-null sets, and consider only the case where the filtration is the augmented
Brownian filtration F= FW := {FWt }0≤t<∞, where FWt := σ
({
Ws
}
0≤s≤t
)∨
N .
The process B represents a money market account, for which we impose that a.s. B ≡ 1, corresponding
to zero interest rate. Other standing assumptions are that capitalizations are exogenously determined, no
dividends are paid, markets are perfectly liquid, trading is frictionless (no transaction costs) and may occur
in arbitrary quantities, and there are no taxes.
2.1 Investment in the Premodel
The model for investment in the risky assets of the premodel is of the usual type for equity market models. A
trading strategy H˜ ′t := (H˜1,t , . . . , H˜n,t) is a predictable process representing the number of shares held of each
stock. Note that since X˜ is a stock capitalization process, the number of shares outstanding of each company
has effectively been normalized to one, and so H˜ is with respect to this one share. The wealth process V w,H˜
associated to trading strategy H˜ is assumed to be self-financing, so satisfies
V˜ w,H˜t = H˜Bt + H˜ ′t X˜t = w+(H˜ · X˜)t ,
where w is the initial wealth and H˜B is the number of shares of money market account. We follow Delbaen
and Schachermayer’s definition of admissible trading strategies from Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006).
Definition 2.1 Admissible trading strategies are predictable processes H˜ such that
(i) H˜ is X˜-integrable, that is, the stochastic integral H˜ · X˜ = (∫ t0 H˜sdX˜s)t≥0 is well-defined in the sense of
stochastic integration theory for semimartingales.
(ii) There is a constant R such that a.s.
(H˜ · X˜)t ≥−R, ∀t ≥ 0. (2.3)
The second restriction is designed to rule out “doubling strategies” (see Karatzas and Shreve (1998), p.8) and
represent the realistic constraint that credit lines are limited.
It will also be useful in the context of relative arbitrage to develop the notion of a portfolio, a` la Fernholz
and Karatzas (2009).
Definition 2.2 A portfolio pi is an F-progressively measurable n-dimensional process bounded uniformly in
(t,ω), with values in the set
⋃
κ∈N
{
(pi1, . . .pin) ∈ R
n | pi21 + . . .+pi
2
n ≤ κ
2,
n
∑
i=1
pii = 1
}
. (2.4)
A long-only portfolio pi is a portfolio that takes values in the unit simplex
∆ n :=
{
(pi1, . . .pin) ∈ R
n | pi1 ≥ 0, . . .pin ≥ 0,
n
∑
i=1
pii = 1
}
.
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A portfolio pi represents the fractional amount of an investor’s wealth invested in each stock. In contrast to a
trading strategy, no borrowing from or lending to the money market is allowed when investment occurs via a
portfolio. This requirement may be dropped and (2.4) may be relaxed in favor of more general integrability
conditions, for example see Fernholz and Karatzas (2010). However for our purposes here, these restrictions
suffice.
For w ∈ R++, the wealth process V˜ w,pi corresponding to a portfolio is defined to be the solution to
dV˜ w,pit = V˜
w,pi
t
n
∑
i=1
pii,t
dX˜i,t
X˜i,t
,
= (V˜ w,pit )pi ′t
[
b(X˜t)dt +σ(X˜t)dW˜t
]
, (2.5)
which by use of Itoˆ’s formula can be verified to be
V˜ w,pit = wexp
{∫ t
0
γ˜pi ,sds+
∫ t
0
pi ′sσ(X˜s)dW˜s
}
, ∀t ≥ 0, (2.6)
where
γ˜pi := pi ′b(X˜)−
1
2
pi ′a(X˜)pi and a(·) := σ(·)σ ′(·).
The process γ˜pi is called the growth rate of the portfolio pi , and a(X˜) is called the covariance process. See
Fernholz and Karatzas (2009) for more details on the properties of these processes.
The definitions of the wealth process V˜ w,pi corresponding to a portfolio and V˜ w,H˜ corresponding to a
trading strategy are consistent in the sense that any portfolio has an a.s. unique corresponding admissible
trading strategy yielding the same wealth process from the same initial wealth. The corresponding trading
strategy H˜w,pi can be obtained from
H˜w,pii =
piiV˜ w,pi
X˜i
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.7)
The market portfolio µ˜ is of particular interest since “beating the market” is often a desirable goal for
investors. The market portfolio is simply the relative capitalization of each company in the market with
respect to the total:
µ˜i,t := µi(X˜t) :=
X˜i,t
∑nj=1 X˜ j,t ,
, 1 ≤ i≤ n.
The market portfolio is a passive portfolio, meaning that once the initial portfolio µ˜ is setup, it is not traded.
The wealth process V˜ w,µ˜t is proportional to the total capitalization of the market, as seen by
V˜ w,µ˜t =
( w
∑nj=1 X˜ j,0
) n
∑
j=1
X˜ j,t , ∀t ≥ 0.
Since the stock capitalization process X˜ a.s. takes values in Ox ⊆ Rn++, then for Oµ := µ(Ox), we have that
a.s., ∀t ≥ 0,
µ˜t ∈ Oµ ⊆ µ(Rn++) = ∆ n+ :=
{
(pi1, . . . ,pin) ∈ R
n | pi1 > 0, . . . ,pin > 0,
n
∑
i
pii = 1
}
.
The closure of a set A ⊆ Rn++ will be referred to as ¯A and, unless otherwise stated, is taken with respect to
the subspace topology of Rn++, and similarly for subsets of ∆ n+. For example, ¯Rn++ = Rn++ and ¯∆ n+ = ∆ n+.
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2.2 Diversity
The notion of diversity entails that no company may ever become too big in terms of relative capitalization.
For generalizations to this notion and their implications see Fernholz et al. (2005). Diversity is a realistic
criterion for a market model to satisfy, since it has held empirically in developed equity markets over time
and should be expected to continue to hold as long as antitrust regulation prevents capital from concentrating
in a single company. In discussions of diversity it is useful to adopt the reverse-order-statistics notation. That
is, for x ∈ Rn,
x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ . . .≥ x(n).
Definition 2.3 A premodel is diverse on [0,T ] if there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that a.s.
µ˜(1),t < 1− δ , ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
A premodel is weakly diverse on [0,T ] if there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that
1
T
∫ T
0
µ˜(1),tdt < 1− δ , a.s.
We will not make much use of diversity until later on, but it is good to keep the definition in mind when
considering the regulation procedure proposed herein.
3 Regulated Market Models
3.1 Overview and Modeling Assumptions
The notion of regulation we introduce consists of confining the market weights (except at exit times) in an
open set U µ by a regulatory procedure that
– conserves the number of companies in the market;
– conserves total market capital;
– conserves portfolio wealth;
– causes a jump in company capitalizations.
Upon exit from U µ , the market weights are mapped back into U µ by a deterministic mapping Rµ applied
to µ˜ at its exit point. Then µ diffuses according to the SDE (2.1) until it exits from U µ again. The cycle
of diffusion and regulation continues on indefinitely, determining a regulated market weight process µ . This
idea will be made precise in the following subsection.
The economic motivation behind the regulated market models presented in this paper is to study markets
with the feature that companies may merge and split, possibly forced to do so by a regulator, with an aim
to explore the ramifications for diversity and arbitrage in these markets. In order to avoid what the authors
believe to be unnecessary mathematical complications in the study of these notions, we require that splits and
merges only occur simultaneously and in pairs, so that the number of companies in the economy remains a
constant. For example, the biggest company may split into two, and simultaneously the smallest two merge
into one.
Two crucial assumptions of our regulated market models are that total market capital and portfolio wealth
are conserved at each regulation event. These assumptions are indeed idealizations, but the authors believe
that the former is a reasonable starting point for studying splits and merges imposed into otherwise continuous
path premodels, while the latter is then sensible in consideration of the below remark.
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Remark 3.1 Consider a company being split into two smaller companies with capitalization fractions ρ and
1− ρ relative to the parent company. If each investor’s money in the parent company is also broken up so
that they are left with fraction ρ invested in the first offspring and 1− ρ invested in the second offspring
immediately following the split, then individual portfolio wealth and total market capital are conserved. This
mapping of portfolio wealth does not impose any constraints on the trading strategies or portfolios available
in the regulated market. Since trading occurs in continuous time, any investor may simply rearrange all of
her money just after regulation. That our investor may do this without affecting market prices reflects the
assumption that stock capitalizations are exogenously determined, that is, our investor is small relative to the
market, and her behavior has negligible impact on asset prices.
The alternative to the wealth conservation assumption would be to impose a random jump in portfolio wealth
at regulation. This would be compelling for studies of event-driven arbitrage, but since here our purpose is to
study the structural-type arbitrage arising from diversity, we feel that this is a reasonable omission.
3.2 Regulated Markets
In this section we will construct the regulated stock process by means of induction via the diffusion-regulation
cycle outlined in the previous subsection. Since the SDE (2.1) for X˜ satisfies strong existence and pathwise
uniqueness, then we need not pass to a new probability space to construct the regulated model. Extensions are
possible when (2.1) merely satisfies weak existence and weak uniqueness, but for simplicity of presentation,
we do not pursue these generalizations here.
Definition 3.2 A regulation rule Rµ with respect to the open, nonempty regulatory set U µ ⊆ Oµ ⊆ ∆ n+ is a
Borel function
R
µ : ∂U µ →U µ .
The regulation rule (U µ ,Rµ) uniquely determines the following set and capital-conserving map of stock
capitalizations:
Ux := µ−1(U µ)⊆ Ox,
R
x : ∂Ux →Ux,
R
x(x) :=
(
n
∑
i=1
xi
)
R
µ(µ(x)).
The inclusion Ux ⊆ Ox follows from our assumption that Ox is conic, which implies Ox = µ−1(Oµ). The
set Ux is conic, that is x ∈ Ux ⇒ λ x ∈ Ux, ∀λ > 0, allowing any total market value for a given µ ∈ U µ .
Therefore, the market capitalization M is a degree of freedom for the regulatory mapping, in the sense that
µ(Rx(x)) = µ(Rx(λ x)), ∀λ > 0. Specification of (Ux,Rx) or (U µ ,Rµ) uniquely determines the other, so
we refer to either as “regulation rules,” and in discussion drop the labels and refer to them as (U,R).
Define the following processes and random variables:
W 1 :=W, X1 := X˜ ,
τ0 := 0, τ1 := ς1 := inf
{
t > 0 | µ(X1t ) /∈U µ
}
.
The process X1 will serve as the first piece of the regulated capitalization process on the stochastic inter-
val [0,τ1]:= {(t,ω) ∈ [0,∞)×Ω | 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1(ω)}. At τ1, X1 has just exited Ux, so the regulation procedure
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maps the capitalization process to Rx(X1ς1), and the regulated capitalization process continues from that point
according to the dynamics given by the SDE (2.1). To implement this, define the following variables and
processes inductively, ∀k ∈ N on {τk−1 < ∞}, terminating if P(τk−1 < ∞) = 0:
W kt :=Wτk−1+t −Wτk−1 , ∀t ≥ 0,
dX ki,t = X ki,t
(
bi(X kt )dt +
d
∑
ν=1
σiν(X kt )dW kν,t
)
, 1 ≤ i≤ n, (3.1)
X k0 =
{
y0 ∈Ux, for k = 1,
R
x(X k−1ςk−1), for k > 1,
ςk := inf
{
t > 0 | X kt /∈Ux
}
,
τk :=
k
∑
j=1
ς j.
If for some k ∈ N the induction terminates because P(τk−1 < ∞) = 0, then on {τk−1 < ∞}, ∀m ≥ k define
Xm ≡ y0 ∈Ux, τm = ∞, ςm = 0. Use these same definitions ∀m ∈N on {τm−1 = ∞}. These cases are included
for completeness and their specifics are irrelevant for the subsequent development.
By the strong Markov property of Brownian motion and stationarity of its increments, if P(τk−1 <∞)> 0,
then for
F
k
t := Fτk−1+t , F
k := {F kt }t≥0,
(W k,Fk) is a Brownian motion on {τk−1 < ∞}, that is, on (Ω ∩{τk−1 < ∞},F ∩{τk−1 < ∞}). The SDE (3.1)
for k ≥ 2 has the same form as the SDE (2.1) for X˜ , but with W k in place of W , and with initial condition
X k0 =R
x(X kςk−1) a.s. on {τk−1 < ∞}. Therefore, on {τk−1 < ∞} by strong existence, there exists X
k adapted
to Fk satisfying (3.1).
Each ςk is a stopping time with respect to Fk, since it is the hitting time of the closed set Rn \Ux by
the continuous process X k. Therefore each τk is an F-stopping time. Since Rx(X k−1ςk−1) ∈U
x
, then ςk > 0 and
τk > τk−1 both a.s. on {τk−1 < ∞}, for all k such that P(τk−1 < ∞)> 0. Note that under this construction there
is the possibility of explosion, that is, of τ∞ := limk→∞ τk < ∞. This will be considered in greater detail later
on.
We are now ready to define the regulated capitalization process Y by pasting together and shifting the
{X k}∞1 at the {τk}∞1 as follows.
Definition 3.3 With respect to regulation rule (U,R) and initial point y0 ∈Ux, the regulated capitalization
process is defined as
Yt(ω) :=
{
X10 1{0}(t)+∑∞k=1 1(τk−1,τk](t,ω)X kt−τk−1(ω), ∀(t,ω) ∈ [0,τ∞),
X10 , ∀(t,ω) /∈ [0,τ∞),
(3.2)
where P(X10 = y0) = 1. If P(τ∞ = ∞) = 1, then we call the triple (y0,U,R) viable for the premodel.
To count the number of regulations by time t, let Nt := ∑∞k=1 1{t>τk}, t ≥ 0. Since each τk is a stopping time,
N is F-adapted. Each X k is Fk-progressive, so by a standard shift argument Y can be seen to be F-adapted,
and therefore also F-progressive due to the left-continuity of its paths.
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3.3 Investment in the Regulated Market
As remarked earlier, in the regulated model wealth is unaltered by a regulatory event. Specifically, the wealth
process V w,H of trading strategy H does not jump upon redistribution of market capital at τ+k . However, the
capitalization Y does jump. This implies that the capital gains of a trading strategy can’t be the stochastic
integral of the trading strategy with respect to the regulated capitalization process. In order to recover the
useful tool of representing the capital gains process as a stochastic integral, we define a net capitalization
process Ŷ , which only accounts for the non-regulatory movements of Y .
Definition 3.4 The net capitalization process Ŷ is defined as
Ŷt :=
{
Yt −∑Ntk=1(Rx(Y kτk )−Yτk), ∀(t,ω) ∈ [0,τ∞),
Y0, ∀(t,ω) /∈ [0,τ∞).
(3.3)
The process Ŷ is F-adapted since Y and N are adapted. If the regulated market is viable, then a.s. Ŷ has
continuous paths since then a.s. Y has piecewise continuous paths, jumping only at the τk. The following
representations of Ŷ will also be useful and are obtainable from the definitions of Y and Ŷ and (3.1).
Ŷt = Y0 +
Nt+1∑
k=1
(X k(t−τk−1)∧ςk −X
k
0 ), ∀(ω , t) ∈ [0,τ∞) (3.4)
dŶi,t = Yi,t
[
bi(Yt)dt +
d
∑
ν=1
σiν(Yt)dWt
]
, 1 ≤ i≤ n, on [0,τ∞). (3.5)
The net capitalization process is the correct process to fulfill the role of integrator for a trading strategy
in the regulated market. To see this, let trading strategy H be the number of shares invested in the regulated
stock process Y . The wealth process V H should be locally self-financing on each stochastic interval (τk−1,τk]
and without jumps, so that
V w,Ht = w+
Nt∑
k=1
∫ τk
τ+k−1
HsdYs +
∫ t
τ+Nt
HsdYs.
Then since Ŷt − Ŷτk−1 = Yt −Yτk−1 on (τk−1,τk] for all k ∈ N, we have
V w,Ht = w+
Nt∑
k=1
∫ τk
τk−1
HsdŶs +
∫ t
τNt
HsdŶs,
= w+(H · Ŷ )t .
This motivates the following natural analog of the usual self-financing condition.
Definition 3.5 In a viable regulated market, a wealth process V w,H corresponding to Ŷ -integrable trading
strategy H is called self-financing in the regulated market if
V w,Ht = w+(H · Ŷ )t , ∀t ≥ 0.
As in the premodel, in a viable regulated model we will henceforth assume that all wealth processes are
self-financing and that all trading strategies are Ŷ -admissible, which means that H is Ŷ -integrable, and H · Ŷ
is a.s. bounded from below uniformly in time, paralleling Definition 2.1.
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A portfolio in the regulated model will be denoted by pi , and is a process meeting the requirements of Defini-
tion 2.2. It represents the fractional amount of total wealth invested in the regulated stocks Y . Paralleling the
premodel (2.5) for initial wealth w ∈ R++, the wealth process V w,pi corresponding to pi is given by
V w,pit = wexp
{∫ t
0
γpi ,sds+
∫ t
0
pi ′sσ(Ys)dWs
}
, ∀t ≥ 0, (3.6)
where
γpi := pi ′b(Y )−
1
2
pi ′a(Y )pi , a(·) = σ(·)σ ′(·).
The market portfolio is the portfolio with the same weights µ as the market. Note that unlike H˜w,µ˜ , which
is constant, Hw,µ is piecewise constant, jumping at the τk. All portfolios, including the market portfolio, have
wealth processes of identical functional form (compare (3.6) and (2.6)) in the regulated model and in the
premodel. Therefore, from a mathematical viewpoint, the differences in investment opportunities in these
markets are completely due to the differences in dynamics of b(Y ) and σ(Y ) compared to b(X˜) and σ(X˜),
which is in turn due to confining X˜ to Ux via Rx to obtain Y .
3.4 Split-Merge Regulation
The exemplar for regulation used in this paper is the split-merge regulation rule. The basic economic mo-
tivation behind split-merge regulation is that it provides a means for regulators to control the size of the
largest company in the economy. At each τk, the largest company is split into two new companies of equal
capitalization. In order to avoid the mathematical complications of a market model with a variable number
of companies, we also impose that at each τk the smallest two companies merge, so that the total number
of companies is a constant, n. A natural trigger for when regulators might force a large company to split is
company size. For example, regulation may be triggered when the biggest company reaches 1− δ in relative
capitalization.
The purpose of this subsection is to define the class of split-merge regulation rules and to find sufficient
conditions for the viability of this class. These results are summarized in Lemma 3.10.
To identify which company by index occupies the kth rank at time t, we use the random function pt(·) so
that µpt (k),t = µ(k),t , for 1≤ k≤ n. Similarly, for the vector x := (x1, . . . ,xn) we use p(·) satisfying xp(k) = x(k),
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In the event that several components are tied, for example x(k) = . . .x(k+ j), then ties are settled
by p(k)< .. . < p(k+ j).
To define the notion of split-merge regulation, we first define a regulation prerule, which captures the
essential idea but still requires some technical refinement.
Definition 3.6 In a market where n ≥ 3, a split-merge regulation prerule (U µ , ˇRµ) with respect to open,
nonempty regulatory set U µ ⊆ Oµ is a mapping
ˇR
µ : ¯U µ → ∆ n+
such that
ˇR
µ(µ) = µ , ∀µ ∈U µ ,
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and ˇRµ ↾∂Uµ is specified by the map:
µp(1) 7→
µp(1)
2
,
µp(n−1) 7→
µp(1)
2
,
µp(n) 7→ µp(n)+ µp(n−1),
µp(k) 7→ µp(k), ∀k : 2 ≤ k < n− 1.
The split-merge regulation prerule can be interpreted as splitting the largest company in half into two new
companies and forcing the smallest two companies to merge into a new company. The condition n≥ 3 insures
that these companies are distinct. The new companies from the split are assigned the indices of the previous
largest and the previous second smallest companies. The new company from the merge is assigned the index
of the previous smallest company.
Remark 3.7 Due to the interchange of indices, this interpretation makes economic sense only in a market
model where the companies are taken to be generic, that is, they have no firm-specific (index-specific) prop-
erties. For example, in a market model where sector-specific correlations are being modeled, it would not
make sense for an oil company resulting from a split to take over the index of a technology company freed
up from a merge, since the subsequent correlations would not be realistic. The examples in this paper focus
on generic market models, so this interpretation is sensible for them.
A split-merge regulation prerule (U µ , ˇRµ) is not quite suitable for our notion of split-merge regulation,
because in the event that µ(1),τk = µ(2),τk = . . . = µ( j),τk , we desire that all of these largest companies be
broken up, not just one of them. This can be easily accomplished, however, by repeating the procedure n
times.
Definition 3.8 If n ≥ 3 and split-merge regulation prerule (U µ , ˇRµ ) is into ¯U µ , then we may define
R
µ := ( ˇRµ ◦ . . .◦ ˇRµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
n compositions
) ↾∂Uµ .
If Rµ is into U µ , then we may restrict the codomain to U µ , and we call the resulting function (U µ ,Rµ) the
split-merge regulation rule associated with (U µ , ˇRµ).
Note that the above definition implies that when a split-merge regulation rule exists, it is a regulation rule. The
following technical lemma will be handy for verifying the viability of split-merge rules. We use the notation
C2b(∆ n+,R) to denote the continuous bounded functions from ∆ n+ to R with partial derivatives continuous and
bounded through 2nd order.
Lemma 3.9 If the SDE (2.1) has drift b(·) and volatility σ(·) functions which are bounded on Ux, and there
exists a function G ∈C2b(∆ n+,R) such that the regulation rule (U,R) satisfies either
inf{G(Rµ(µ))−G(µ) | µ ∈ ∂U µ}> 0
or sup{G(Rµ(µ))−G(µ) | µ ∈ ∂U µ}< 0,
where ∂U µ is the boundary of the set U µ taken as a subset of the space ∆ n+, then the regulated market is
viable.
Proof See Section 6.
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We turn now to the question of identifying suitable regulatory sets U for split-merge regulation that are both
economically compelling and generate viable split-merge rules.
Lemma 3.10 Suppose the following hold:
(i) n≥ 3.
(ii) δ ∈ (0, n−1
n+1).
(iii) The regulatory set,
U µ := {µ ∈ ∆ n+ | µ(1) < 1− δ},
satisfies U µ ⊆ Oµ .
(iv) (U µ , ˇRµ ) is a split-merge regulation prerule.
(v) The functions b(·) and σ(·) are bounded on Ux.
Then the split-merge rule (U µ ,Rµ) associated with (U µ , ˇRµ) exists and is viable.
Proof See Section 6.
3.5 Arbitrage
We begin with the notions of arbitrage, relative arbitrage, and no free lunch with vanishing risk (NFLVR).
Then we recall the fundamental theorem of asset pricing (FTAP) for locally bounded semimartingales and
discuss its implications for regulated market models.
Definition 3.11 In the premodel an arbitrage over [0,T ] is an admissible trading strategy H˜ such that
P[(H˜ · X˜)T ≥ 0] = 1 and P[(H˜ · X˜)T > 0]> 0. (3.7)
A relative arbitrage over [0,T ] with respect to portfolio η˜ is a portfolio pi such that
P(V˜ 1,piT ≥ V˜
1,η˜
T ) = 1 and P(V˜
1,pi
T > V˜
1,η˜
T )> 0. (3.8)
The corresponding notions of strong arbitrage and strong relative arbitrage are defined by making the first
inequalities of (3.7) and (3.8) strict, respectively.
The condition NFLVR is a strengthening of the no arbitrage condition, roughly implying that not only are
there no arbitrages, but no “approximate arbitrages.” See Delbaen and Schachermayer (2006, 1994, 1998) for
a complete exposition.
Definition 3.12 For T ∈ R++ define
K˜ :=
{
(H˜ · X˜)T | H˜ admissible
}
,
which is a convex cone of random variables in L0(Ω ,FT ,P), and
C˜ :=
{
g˜ ∈ L∞(FT ,P) | g˜ ≤ f˜ for some f˜ ∈ K˜
}
.
The condition no free lunch with vanishing risk (NFLVR) over [0,T ] with respect to X˜ is
C˜∩L∞+(FT ,P) = {0},
where C˜ denotes the closure of C˜ with respect to the norm topology of L∞(FT ,P).
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For the analogs of Definitions 3.11 and 3.12 in a viable regulated model, simply replace X˜ with Ŷ and remove
all other “˜”.
The FTAP states that NFLVR for the integrator of the class of trading strategies is equivalent to the
existence of an ELMM for the integrator. In the premodel the integrator is ˜X , while in the regulated model it
is Ŷ . Since Ŷ obeys the SDE (3.5), then from standard theory in order for (Ŷ )0≤t≤T to be a local martingale
under an equivalent measure Q given by dQdP =: ZT ∈ FT , then there exists a strictly positive martingale
(Zt)0≤t≤T satisfying Zt = E[ZT |Ft ] and having the representation:
Zt := E (−θ (Y ) ·W)t = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
θ (Ys)′dWs−
1
2
∫ t
0
|θ (Ys)′|2ds
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.9)
where the market price of risk θ (·) solves the market price of risk equation
σ(Yt)θ (Yt) = b(Yt), a.s., 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.10)
Given an exponential local martingale of the form (3.9), satisfaction of the Novikov criterion,
E
[
exp
{
1
2
∫ T
0
|θs|2 ds
}]
< ∞, (3.11)
is sufficient for implying the martingality of (Z)0≤t≤T .
While the NFLVR condition is of theoretical interest, it is not necessarily of practical relevance. If we put
ourselves in the situation of having to select from some set of candidate market models, some of which satisfy
NFLVR and others of which do not, it may be a hopeless task to figure out whether financial data support
or refute NFLVR. In fact, example 4.7 Karatzas and Kardaras (2007) shows that two general semimartingale
models on the same stochastic basis may possess the same triple of predictable characteristics, with one
admitting an arbitrage while the other does not. Even if we have reason to believe that a model admitting
arbitrage or relative arbitrage is an accurate one, it may be the case that the arbitrage portfolios depend in
a delicate way on the parameters of the model, b and σ here. In such a case any attempts to estimate these
parameters from observed data would likely be too imprecise to lead to an investment strategy that could
convincingly be called an approximation to an arbitrage.
In contrast to this, the condition of diversity is supported by world market data and the existence of an-
titrust laws in developed markets. The condition (3.12) of uniform ellipticity of the covariance is not as readily
apparent, but seems to be a reasonable manifestation of the idea that there is always at least some baseline
level of volatility in markets. The significance of these two conditions is that in unregulated market models
together they imply the existence of a long-only relative arbitrage portfolio that is functionally generated from
the market weights (see Section 3.6 herein for the precise conditions as well as Fernholz (1999b); Fernholz
and Karatzas (2005, 2009)), not requiring estimation of b or σ . It is therefore of great interest whether or not
this implication carries over to regulated markets. The following proposition will be useful in Section 4 for
showing that this is not the case.
Proposition 3.13 If the regulated model is viable, Ŷ satisfies NFLVR over [0,T ], and σ(·) is bounded on Ux,
then any ELMM for Ŷ is an EMM, and no portfolio is a relative arbitrage with respect to any other portfolio
over [0,T ] in the regulated model.
Proof To prove the martingality, let measure Q be any ELMM for Ŷ , and therefore have the form dQdP = ZT =
E (−θ (Y ) ·W )T , where θ (Y ) solves the market price of risk equation (3.10). Then Equation (3.5) implies that
dŶi,t = Yi,t(
d
∑
ν=1
σiν(Yt)dW (Q)ν,t ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
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where
W (Q)t :=Wt +
∫ t
0
θ (Ys)ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
is a Q-Brownian motion by Girsanov’s theorem. This implies that
dV w,pit =V
w,pi
t pi
′
t σ(Yt)dW
(Q)
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Therefore, (V w,pi)0≤t≤T is an exponential Q-local martingale. Since Y ∈ Ux, dt × dP-a.e., this implies that
σ(Y ) is bounded, dt × dP-a.e. The portfolio pi is uniformly bounded by definition, so (V w,pit )0≤t≤T is a Q-
martingale by the Novikov criterion (3.11).
Now suppose that pi is a relative arbitrage with respect to η . Then by Q∼ P it follows that
Q(V w,piT ≥V w,ηT ) = 1 and Q(V w,piT >V w,ηT )> 0.
However (V w,pit )0≤t≤T and (V
w,η
t )0≤t≤T are both Q-martingales, so their difference is also a Q-martingale,
with EQ[V w,piT −V
w,η
T ] = w−w = 0. This contradicts the relative arbitrage property above, so this market
admits no pair of relative arbitrage portfolios. ⊓⊔
Some recent investigations pertaining to relative arbitrage include Fernholz et al. (2005), Fernholz and
Karatzas (2005), Fernholz and Banner (2008), Ruf (2010), and Mijatovic´ and Urusov (2009), to name a
few. An arbitrage is essentially a relative arbitrage with respect to the money market account, modulo the
uniform boundedness requirement of portfolios and their prohibition from investing in the money market,
both of which can be relaxed as in Fernholz and Karatzas (2010). The existence of a relative arbitrage does
not imply the existence of an arbitrage, as illustrated by examples, often called “bubble markets” (see Cox
and Hobson (2005); Pal and Protter (2010); Protter et al. (2007)), where there exists an equivalent measure
under which the stock process is a strict local martingale. In particular, if pi is a relative arbitrage with respect
to η˜ , then the trading strategy H˜ := H˜1,pi − H˜1,η˜ need not satisfy the requirement that H˜ · X˜ be uniformly
bounded from below, so H˜ need not be admissible.
3.6 Diversity, Intrinsic Volatility, and Relative Arbitrage
The works by Robert Fernholz et al. (Fernholz (1999a, 2002); Fernholz and Karatzas (2005)) on diversity
and arbitrage prove that for unregulated markets, over an arbitrary time horizon, there exist strong relative
arbitrage portfolios with respect to the market portfolio in any weakly diverse market satisfying certain as-
sumptions and regularity conditions. Furthermore, they show how such relative arbitrages can be constructed
as long-only portfolios which are functionally generated from µ˜ , not requiring knowledge of b˜ or σ˜ . A suffi-
cient set of assumptions and regularity are given by the following.
Assumption 3.1 (i) The capitalizations are modeled by an Itoˆ process
dX˜i,t = X˜i,t
(
b˜i,tdt +
d
∑
ν=1
σ˜iν,tdWν,t
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
X˜0 = x0 ∈ Rn++,
where b˜ and σ˜ are progressively measurable processes satisfying ∀T ∈ R++,
n
∑
i=1
(∫ T
0
|b˜i,t |dt +
d
∑
ν=1
∫ T
0
∣∣σ˜iν,t ∣∣2dt
)
< ∞, a.s.
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(ii) The capitalizations’ covariance process is uniformly elliptic:
∃ε > 0 : a.s. ε |ξ |2 ≤ ξ σ˜t σ˜ ′t ξ , ∀t ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈Rn. (3.12)
(iii) Companies pay no dividends (and therefore can’t control their size by this means).
(iv) The number of companies is a constant.
(v) The market is weakly diverse.
(vi) Trading may occur in continuous time, in arbitrary quantities, is frictionless, and does not impact prices.
These conditions have been generalized in Fernholz and Karatzas (2005). There it is shown that the uniform
ellipticity assumption may be relaxed, and the market need not be weakly diverse if it satisfies one of several
notions of “sufficient intrinsic volatility.” One measure of the intrinsic volatility in the market is the excess
growth rate of the market portfolio,
γ∗µ˜,t =
1
2
(
n
∑
i=1
µ˜i,t a˜ii,t − µ˜ ′t a˜t µ˜t
)
.
The following proposition provides an example of a “sufficient intrinsic volatility” type condition.
Proposition 3.14 (adapted from Proposition 3.1 Fernholz and Karatzas (2005)) Assume an unregulated
market model satisfies items (i), (iii), (iv), and (vi) of Assumption 3.1. Additionally suppose there exists a
continuous, strictly increasing function Γ˜ : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) with Γ˜ (0) = 0, Γ˜ (∞) = ∞, and satisfying a.s.
Γ˜ (t)≤
∫ t
0
γ˜∗µ˜,sds < ∞, for all 0 ≤ t < ∞. (3.13)
Then there exists a functionally generated, long-only portfolio that is a strong relative arbitrage with respect
to the market portfolio over sufficiently long horizon.
Proof See Fernholz and Karatzas (2005).
A diverse regulated market is simply a regulated market in which µ in place of µ˜ satisfies Definition 2.3.
By Lemma 3.4 of Fernholz and Karatzas (2009) (the proof of which is merely algebraic and has nothing to
do with whether the market model is regulated or not) in a uniformly elliptic, diverse market (respectively,
regulated market), γ˜∗µ˜ (γ∗µ ) satisfies
εδ
2
≤ γ˜∗µ˜,t , ∀t ≥ 0
(
εδ
2
≤ γ∗µ,t , ∀t ≥ 0
)
. (3.14)
In this equation ε satisfies ε |ξ |2 ≤ ξ σ˜t σ˜ ′t ξ (ε |ξ |2 ≤ ξ σtσ ′t ξ ), ∀t ≥ 0, ∀ξ ∈ Rn, and δ satisfies µ(1) ≤ 1− δ
(µ˜(1) ≤ 1− δ ). This implies that in any uniformly elliptic, diverse market (regulated market), that (3.13) (its
regulated market counterpart) is satisfied by Γ˜ (t) = εδ2 t (Γ (t) = εδ2 t). In the examples of Section 4, NFLVR
and no relative arbitrage hold for the regulated markets, while diversity and uniform ellipticity also hold,
implying that (3.13) is satisfied in these cases. Therefore, in contrast to the premodel, the conditions of weak
diversity and uniform ellipticity together, and thus also the weaker condition of sufficient intrinsic volatility,
are not sufficient for the existence of relative arbitrage in the regulated model.
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4 Examples of Regulated Markets
In this section we apply the split-merge regulation of subsection 3.4 to geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
and a log-pole market as premodels. In both cases the regulated market is diverse and uniformly elliptic, and
therefore satisfies the regulated market analog of the sufficient intrinsic volatility condition (3.13). In both
cases the regulated market satisfies NFLVR and admits no pair of relative arbitrage portfolios.
4.1 Geometric Brownian Motion
Consider the case where the unregulated capitalization process is a GBM,
dX˜i,t = X˜i,t
[
bidt +
n
∑
ν=1
σiν dWν,t
]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
X˜0 = x0 ∈Ox = Rn++,
for some n ≥ 3, b ∈ Rn, and σ ∈ Rn×n of rank n. GBM satisfies NFLVR on all [0,T ], T ∈ R++ and has
constant volatility, so it is not weakly diverse on any [0,T ] and admits no pair of relative arbitrage portfolios
(see Section 6 of Fernholz and Karatzas (2009)). Select δ ∈ (0, n−1
n+1) and define the regulatory set
U µ := {µ ∈ ∆ n+ | µ(1) < 1− δ}.
By Lemma 3.10 the associated split-merge rule exists and is viable. Since θ := σ−1b is a constant, the
Novikov criterion (3.11) for Z := E (−θ ·W ) is satisfied, and Z is therefore a martingale. This implies that for
any T ∈R++, Q specified by dQdP := ZT is an ELMM for (Ŷt)0≤t≤T . Furthermore, (Ŷt)0≤t≤T is a Q-martingale,
and the regulated market is free of relative arbitrage by Proposition 3.13. The regulated market is diverse
since P(µt ∈ ¯U µ , ∀t ≥ 0)= P(µ(1),t ≤ 1− δ , ∀t ≥ 0) = 1, which implies that (3.14) and thus (3.13) are
satisfied. Therefore in this regulated market, the notions of sufficient intrinsic volatility and diversity coexist
with NFLVR and no relative arbitrage.
4.2 Log-Pole Market
So-called “log-pole” market models provide examples of diverse, unregulated markets. Diversity is main-
tained in these markets by means of a log-pole-type singularity in the drift of the largest capitalization,
diverging to −∞ as the largest weight µ(1) approaches the diversity cap 1− δ . Explicit portfolios which are
relative arbitrages with respect to the market portfolio over any prespecified time horizon may be formed
by down-weighting the largest company in a controlled manner (see e.g. Fernholz et al. (2005); Fernholz
and Karatzas (2009)). This model can be interpreted as a continuous approximation of an economy in which
the relative size of the largest company is controlled via a regulator imposing fines on it. When regulatory
breakup is applied, keeping the largest weight µ(1) away from 1− δ , then the arbitrage opportunities vanish.
Following Section 9 of Fernholz and Karatzas (2009) (see Fernholz et al. (2005) for more details and
generality) fix n ≥ 3, δ ∈ (0, 12) and consider the unregulated capitalization process X˜ , the pathwise unique
strong solution to
dX˜i,t = X˜i,t
(
bi(X˜t)dt +
n
∑
ν=1
σiνWν,t
)
, 1 ≤ i≤ n,
X˜0 = x0 ∈ Ox := {x0 ∈ Rn++ | µ(1)(x0)< 1− δ},
Diversity and Arbitrage in a Regulatory Breakup Model 17
where σ ∈ Rn×n is rank n. The function b(·) is given by
bi(x) :=
1
2 aii + gi1Q
c
i
(x)−
c
δ
1Qi(x)
log((1− δ )/µi(x))
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where {gi}n1 are non-negative numbers, c is a positive number, and
Q1 :=
{
x ∈Rn++ | x1 ≥ max2≤ j≤n
x j
}
, Qn :=
{
x ∈ Rn++ | xn > max1≤ j≤m−1
x j
}
,
Qi :=
{
x ∈Rn++ | xi > max1≤ j≤i−1
x j, xi ≥ max
i+1,≤ j≤n
x j
}
, for i = 2, . . . ,n− 1.
When x ∈Qi, then xi is the largest of the {x j}n1 with ties going to the smaller index. In this model each com-
pany behaves like a geometric Brownian motion when it is not the largest. The largest company is repulsed
away from the log-pole-type singularity in its drift at 1−δ . Strong existence and pathwise uniqueness for this
SDE are guaranteed for any x0 in Ox by Veretennikov (1981) (see also Fernholz et al. (2005)). The capitaliza-
tions satisfy P(X˜t ∈ Ox, ∀t ≥ 0) = 1, so this premodel is diverse. The function b(·) is locally bounded since
the coefficients of 1Qci (x) and 1Qi(x) are continuous on O
x and the singularity at µ(1)(x) = 1−δ is away from
the boundary of each Qi for δ ∈ (0, 12 ). Since the market is diverse and has constant volatility, then by the
results of Fernholz (2002); Fernholz and Karatzas (2009) over arbitrary horizon the market admits long-only
relative arbitrage portfolios which are functionally generated from the market portfolio. Furthermore since σ
is a constant, X˜ has no ELMM so admits a FLVR.
This model may be regulated in such a way to remove these relative arbitrage opportunities and satisfy
NFLVR. Picking δ ′ ∈ (δ , n−1
n+1) and x0 ∈U
x
, define the regulatory set to be
U µ := {µ ∈ ∆ n+ | µ(1) < 1− δ ′} ⊆ Oµ .
The associated split-merge regulation rule exists and is viable by Lemma 3.10. The function b ↾
¯Ux (·) is
bounded, so taking θ (·) := σ−1b(·), then θ (Y ) is a.s. bounded uniformly in time. This implies that the
Novikov criterion (3.11) is satisfied for Z := E (−θ (Y ) ·X), and so Z is a martingale. For any T ∈ R++, Q
specified by dQdP := ZT is an ELMM for (Ŷt)0≤t≤T . Furthermore (Ŷt)0≤t≤T is a Q-martingale, and the regulated
market is free of relative arbitrage by Proposition 3.13. The diversity of the regulated market implies that
(3.14), and thus (3.13) are satisfied. Therefore in this regulated market, the notions of sufficient intrinsic
volatility and diversity coexist with NFLVR and no relative arbitrage.
The pathology of this premodel is that the largest company’s drift approaches −∞ as µ(1) approaches
1− δ . The cure is to prevent the largest company from approaching 1− δ by regulation and thus bound the
worst expected rate of return. The pathological region of ∆ n+ is removed from µ’s state space by the regulation
procedure, and the result is an arbitrage-free market.
5 Conclusions
Models in which diversity is maintained by a drift-type condition, whereby the rate of expected return of
the largest company must become unboundedly negative compared to the rate of expected return of some
other company in the economy, cover only one particular mechanism by which diversity may be achieved.
These are reasonable models for markets in which diversity is maintained by some combination of fines on
big companies imposed by antitrust regulators, and/or the biggest company consistently delivering less return
than the other companies for other reasons. In such markets there is an intuitive undesirability in holding
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the stock of the largest company, since its upside potential is limited relative to that of the other companies.
Fernholz showed that this is not merely a vague undesirability, but that any passive portfolio holding shares
of the biggest company can be strictly outperformed by functionally generated portfolios which are relative
arbitrages with respect to the former.
If regulators maintain diversity within an equity market by utilizing regulatory breakup, then the situation
is quite different. This mechanism need not open the door to arbitrage. It entails no systematic debasement
of the total capital in the economy, and, for many models, can be shown to be arbitrage-free, admitting an
equivalent martingale measure.
The current situation in U.S. markets is that regulatory breakups are uncommonly used, and primarily
in cases reversing provisionally approved mergers. This suggests that the previous conclusion of Fernholz,
Karatzas et al. in Fernholz and Karatzas (2005) that in the past conditions in U.S. markets have likely been
compatible with functionally generated relative arbitrage with respect to the market portfolio, is not threatened
by this result. If, however, regulatory breakup were to become a primary tool of antitrust regulators, then,
modulo our assumption of portfolio wealth conservation, the argument for existence of functionally generated
relative arbitrage in diverse markets would be substantially weakened.
The notions of diversity combined with uniform ellipticity, and the more general “sufficient intrinsic
volatility of the market” are useful conditions in that they can be tested by empirical observations. This is in
contrast to the rather abstract and normative condition of existence of an equivalent martingale measure, for
which it may be hopeless to make a case for or against via observed data alone. That these conditions do not
imply relative arbitrage in regulated market models prompts the question of whether a general, empirically
verifiable condition can be found that implies relative arbitrage for both regulated and unregulated market
models.
6 Proofs
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.9) For µt := µ(Yt), let Gt := G(µt), ∀(ω , t) ∈ [0,τ∞). By Definition 3.4 of Ŷ and
3.5, we can decompose Gt∧τk as
Gt∧τk = G0 +
k
∑
m=1
∫ t∧τm
t∧τ+m−1
dGt +
Nt∧(k−1)
∑
m=1
[G(Rµ(µτm))−Gτm ] . (6.1)
On (τk−1,τk] by Itoˆ’s formula, the process µ obeys
dµi,t = µi,t
[(
(bi(Xt)−
n
∑
j=1
ai j(Xt)µ j,t − [µ ′t b(Xt)− µ ′t a(Xt)µt ]
)
dt
+
d
∑
ν=1
(
σiν(Xt)− [µ ′t σ(Xt)]ν
)
dWν,t
]
,
= Bi,tdt +
d
∑
ν=1
Riν,tdWν,t , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The processes B and R are bounded on (0,τ∞), since b(·) and σ(·) are uniformly bounded on Ux. Defining
Ĝt := Gt −∑Ntm=1 [G(Rµ(µτm))−Gτm ], ∀(t,ω) ∈ [0,τ∞), then by Itoˆ’s formula Ĝ is an Itoˆ process on [0,τ∞),
and so there exist processes C and S taking values in Rn and Rn×d , respectively, such that
dĜt =Ctdt + StdWt , on (0,τ∞).
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The integrands C and S are uniformly bounded on (0,τ∞) since the first and second derivatives of G(·) are by
assumption bounded on ∆ n+, and B, R above are uniformly bounded on (0,τ∞). This implies that
∫ t∧τ∞
0 Csds
and
∫ t∧τ∞
0 SsdWs are well-defined for all t > 0 by the theories of Lebesgue and stochastic integration. Therefore
limk→∞(1{τ∞<∞}Ĝτk) ∈ R a.s.
By (6.1) and the definition of Ĝ, we have:
Gτk = Ĝτk +
k−1
∑
m=1
[G(Rµ(µτm))−Gτm ] . (6.2)
On {τ∞ < ∞} by assumption either
k−1
∑
m=1
[G(Rµ(µτm))−Gτm ]−→k→∞ ∞, a.s.,
or
k−1
∑
m=1
[G(Rµ(µτm))−Gτm ]−→k→∞ −∞, a.s.
But in (6.2) {Ĝτk}∞1 converges in R a.s. on {τ∞ < ∞}, and G(·) is a bounded function by assumption, so (6.2)
implies that P(τ∞ < ∞) = 0. ⊓⊔
Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.10) Fix n ≥ 3 and δ ∈ (0, n−1
n+1). The boundary of U
µ in ∆ n+ is
∂U µ = {µ ∈ ∆ n+ | µ(1) = 1− δ}.
The set U µ is non-empty and open, and by assumption satisfies U µ ⊆ Oµ . To check that ˇRµ is into ¯U µ , note
that µ ∈ ∂U µ ⇒µ(1) = 1− δ ⇒ µ(n)+ µ(n−1) ≤ 2δn−1 < 2n+1 < 1− δ , where the first inequality follows from
∑nj=1 µ j−µ(1) = δ , implying that the smallest two weights can sum to at most 2δn−1 , and the second inequality
follows from δ ∈ (0, n−1
n+1 ). This implies that all of the “new companies” created by ˇR are of relative size
strictly smaller than 1− δ . So [ ˇR(µ)](1) ≤ 1− δ which implies that ˇR is into ¯U µ . If there were k companies
of relative size 1−δ for µ ∈ ∂U µ , then ˇRµ(µ) has k−1 companies of relative size 1−δ . Therefore, applying
the n-fold composition ( ˇRµ ◦ . . .◦ ˇRµ) to µ ∈ ¯U µ results in no companies of relative size 1−δ . This implies
that Rµ of Definition 3.8 is into U µ , making (U µ ,Rµ) a regulation rule and therefore a split-merge rule.
Consider the entropy function
S : Rn++ →R,
S(x) =−
n
∑
i=1
xi logxi.
We examine the change in entropy resulting from ˇR. For µ ∈ ∂U µ we have µ(1) = 1− δ , and so
S( ˇRµ(µ))− S(µ) =−
[
2
µ(1)
2
log(
µ(1)
2
)+ (µ(n)+ µ(n−1)) log(µ(n)+ µ(n−1))
]
+
[
µ(1) log µ(1)+ µ(n) log µ(n)+ µ(n−1) log µ(n−1)
]
,
= (1− δ ) log2− (µ(n)+ µ(n−1)) log(µ(n)+ µ(n−1))
+ 2
(µ(n) log µ(n)+ µ(n−1) log µ(n−1)
2
)
.
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Applying Jensen’s inequality to the convex function x 7→ x logx, we get
S( ˇRµ(µ))− S(µ)≥ (1− δ ) log2
+(µ(n)+ µ(n−1))
[
− log(µ(n)+ µ(n−1))+ log(
µ(n)+ µ(n−1)
2
)
]
,
= (1− δ ) log2− (µ(n)+ µ(n−1)) log2,
≥ log2
[
1− δ − 2δ
n− 1
]
> 0,
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that ∑nj=1 µ j−µ(1) = δ , so the smallest two weights
can sum to at most 2δ
n−1 . The last inequality follows from the supposition that δ ∈ (0, n−1n+1). From this, the
change in entropy of R can be seen to satisfy
S(Rµ(µ))− S(µ)≥
[
1− δ
(
n+ 1
n− 1
)]
log2 > 0, ∀µ ∈ ∂U µ .
For ε ∈R++, we may define the shifted entropy function
S(ε) : ∆ n+ → R
S(ε)(µ) := S(ε1n + µ) =−
n
∑
i=1
(µi + ε) log(µi + ε),
where 1n is the column vector of n ones. For any κ ∈ (0,∞), the entropy function S restricted to domain
{µ : 0 < µi ≤ κ , for 1 ≤ i≤ n} is uniformly continuous, so therefore ε ∈ (0,1) can be chosen such that
inf
{
S(ε)(Rµ(µ))− S(ε)(µ) | µ ∈ ∂U µ
}
> 0. (6.3)
The shifted entropy function satisfies S(ε) ∈C2b(∆ n+,R), so for an SDE (2.1) with b(·) and σ(·) bounded on
Ux, an application of Lemma 3.9 with G = S(ε) proves the viability of (U,R). ⊓⊔
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